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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Anthony Childers contended that the district court erred when it denied his
request for a psychiatric evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. He demonstrated that,
not only was his mental condition a significant issue at sentencing, but that the
information in the record did not satisfy all the requirements set forth in the statute.
Without that evidence, the district court's decision to forgo the psychiatric evaluation
constituted an abuse of discretion by failing to meet its statutory obligation. The State's
only responses are: first, the mental conditions were not an underlying factor in the
crime and, thus, not an issue at sentencing (ignoring the evidence in the record that his
mental conditions were part of the reason for his substance abuse, which was a direct
underlying factor of his actions); second, regardless of the lack of evidence speaking to
the availability of treatment options for Mr. Childers' conditions and the risks and
benefits thereof, the record satisfied the statutory requirements; and third, the timing of
the request should, for convenience's sake, trump the mandatory requirement
established by the Legislature in the relevant statute.
The State's arguments are markedly unpersuasive, as they ignore the evidence
in the record, as well as the requirements in the statute.

As such, they do not

undermine Mr. Childers's arguments, which reveal the error in the district court's
decision. This Court should remedy that error.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Childers' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it failed to order the requested
psychiatric evaluation?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Order The Requested
Psychiatric Evaluation

A.

Introduction
The district court's decision to deny Mr. Childers' request for an evaluation

pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 was erroneous for two reasons. First, as the evidence in the
record demonstrates, Mr. Childers's mental conditions played a role in the underlying
offenses and he made that factor an issue at sentencing.
mandated a conforming evaluation.

Therefore, I.C. § 19-2522

Second, the other evaluations included in the

record contain incomplete discussions of the availability of treatment for Mr. Childers'
conditions, and particularly, do not contain any discussion about the risks and benefits
of treatment as opposed to nontreatment, both of which are required by the statute.
Therefore, I.C. § 19-2522 obligated the district court to order a conforming evaluation
prior to imposing a sentence on Mr. Childers. As such, regardless of the timing of the
request, the district court was required by statute to order the conforming psychiatric
evaluation and the failure to do so constituted an abuse of its discretion at sentencing.

B.

Mr. Childers' Mental Conditions Were A Factor At Sentencing, Which The District
Court Was Required To Consider
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 not just

suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a
sentencing factor when it was a significant factor in the offense. Hollon v. State, 132
Idaho 573, 581 (1999).

The evidence in the record is clear that Mr. Childers' actions

occurred while he was under the influence of alcohol.

(hereinafter, PE), pp.2-3.)

(Psychosexual Evaluation

The record is also clear that one of the causes of
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Mr. Childers' alcohol abuse is potentially his mental conditions, as he may use alcohol
to self-medicate for his mental conditions. 1 (PE, p.18.)
Furthermore, Mr. Childers' attorney established that Mr. Childers' mental
condition would be a factor to be considered at sentencing when Mr. Childers pied
guilty: "I think as far as mental health, if the psychosexual should pick up anything, if
there looks to be a need after that we'll ask at that point." (Tr., p.22, Ls.21-24.) The
district court permitted this course of action, reserving its decision to order additional
evaluations "depending on what shows up [in the psychosexual evaluation]." (Tr., p.22,
L.21 - p.23, L.1.)

The State did not object to this procedure.

(See general!y

Tr., pp.22-23.) And when the psychosexual evaluation returned with a recommendation
for a psychiatric evaluation in order to determine the availability and potential benefits of
treatment that it could not address (required for the record by I.C. § 19-2522), defense
counsel invoked the reserved request, reaffirming that Mr. Childers' mental condition
would be a factor in the imposition of sentence:

"[t]his is a case where [the

prosecutor] is going to recommend that the Court impose sentence. The indication from
Dr. Hatzenbuehler is that she believes there could be things that are not picked up by
her evaluation.

I think under those circumstances the Court is better taken to order

such an evaluation at this time."

(Tr., p.28, Ls.5-10.)

Basically, defense counsel's

As the psychosexual evaluator pointed out, she was not able to determine to what
extent that was the case without the psychiatric evaluation. (See PE, p.18.) The State
ignores this evidence in the record, which connects Mr. Childers' mental condition to his
alcohol abuse, and argues that his alcohol abuse alone was the underlying factor to be
considered.
(Resp. Br., pp.6-7.)
Additionally, this position would lead to an
inappropriate and impractical rule for the courts to apply in future cases, as it would
essentially allow for the artificial separation of a physical action from its motivational
component.
1
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request indicates that the mental health issues would be mitigating in nature, thus
countering the prosecutor's request for imprisonment, and therefore, the mental health
issues needed to be sufficiently considered by the district court before it imposed
Mr. Childers' sentence.

As such, Mr. Childers' mental condition was put before the

district court as a significant sentencing issue, one which could potentially mean the
difference between incarceration or another, more lenient alternative.
Because Mr. Childers' mental conditions were necessarily a significant factor in
the alleged acts and in the sentencing determination, the district court was statutorily
obligated to consider Mr. Childers' mental conditions (meaning that it could not, within
its discretion, refuse to consider Mr. Childers' mental conditions).

I.C. § 19-2523;

Hollon, 132 Idaho at 581. There is no exception in the statute for "minor," as opposed
to "major" mental conditions, see generally I.C. § 19-2523, as the district court seemed
to believe.

(See Tr., p.28, Ls.11-21.)

Regardless, the district court's assertion that

there was no indication of some major mental illness or some overriding psychiatric
diagnosis in the record is clearly erroneous because the Presentence Investigation
Report (hereinafter, PSI) also reveals that both Bipolar Disorder and Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) both major mental illnesses, 2 were potentially affecting
Mr. Childers.

(PSI, p.11.) This also further demonstrates why the district court was

2

Bipolar disorder is a mental disorder with severe, potentially-life-altering symptoms.
See National Institute of Mental Health, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services,
"Bipolar Disorder," p.1 (2008), http://mentalhealth.gov/health/publications/bipolardisorder/nimh-bipolar-adults.pdf. ADHD, as one of the most common mental disorders,
is also a major mental health condition, which has the potential to cause the patient
lifelong challenges. See National Institute of Mental Health, U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services, "Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), p.1 (2008),
http://mentalhealth.gov/health/publications/attention-deficit-hyperactivity-disorder/
adhd_booklet.pdf.
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statutorily obligated to order a psychiatric evaluation prior to imposing sentence. See
I.C. § 19-2522.

C.

Because The District Court Was Statutorily Obligated To Consider Mr. Childers'
Mental Condition, It Was Also Statutorily Obligated To Ensure The Record
Contained Evidence Of The Treatment Options, Risks, And Benefits, Which It
Failed To Do
While the district court does have some discretion over whether to order a

psychiatric evaluation, once it is clear that the defendant's mental condition is a
significant factor, that discretion is limited by the statutory obligations imposed by the
Legislature in I.C. §§ 19-2522 and -2523. 3 The district court was required to ensure that
the record contained "[a] consideration of whether treatment is available for the
defendant's mental condition; [and a)n analysis of the relative risks and benefits of
treatment or nontreatment." I.C. § 19-2522(3)(d)-(e). In fact, the Court of Appeals has
already held that "the statute requires that the evaluation be conducted before
sentencing so that the trial court will have the benefit of the evaluator's insights in
fashioning an appropriate sentence." State v. Banbury, 145 Idaho 265, 269 (Ct. App.
2007) (quoting State v. Coonts, 137 Idaho 150, 153 (Ct. App. 2002)).
The record actually contains a clear statement that there is insufficient evidence
therein to satisfy the statute's requirements: "I would also recommend that he have a
psychiatric evaluation to determine if psychotropic medications would be of benefit to
him." (PE, p.18 (emphasis added).) Dr. Hatzenbuehler informed the district court that
there was a potential treatment alternative, the benefits of which could not be sufficiently

3

I.C. § 19-2522 establishes the requirements for the necessary psychiatric evaluation
itself. I.C. § 19-2523 sets forth the factors the district court must consider in regard to
the defendant's specific condition.
7

considered (as required by I.C. § 19-2522(3)(e)) without a psychiatric evaluation.
(See PE, p.18.)
The State attempts to justify the district court's failure to comply with the statute
by pointing to the recommendations from the substance abuse evaluation and the
psychosexual evaluation. (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) Neither evaluation, however, contains
any discussion of the potential benefits Mr. Childers could receive from a psychotropic
medication regimen; nor do they discuss the risks and benefits of not providing him
such medication. (See generally PE, GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral Summary

(hereinafter, GRRS).) Therefore, none of the evidence upon which the State relies can
satisfy the statutory obligation placed on the district court in this regard.

Compare

Banbury, 145 Idaho at 269-70 (wherein the Court of Appeals, in a similar situation,
found that the other evaluations in the record did not address the factors set forth for
consideration in I.C. § 19-2522, and thus, the district court erred by not ordering the
additional, necessary evaluation).
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has held that the record "must satisfy the
criteria set out in I.C. § 19-2522(3)." State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879 (Ct. App.
1994) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, it has reaffirmed that stance, holding that, in
this regard, "[a] district court's election not to order a psychological evaluation will be
upheld on appeal if ... the information already before the court adequately met the
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3)."

State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822 (Ct. App.

2010). These holdings lead to only one conclusion: where the record fails to satisfy the
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3), the district court's decision to not order the required

8

evaluation constitutes an abuse of its discretion. 4 See id.; McFarland, 125 Idaho at 879.
The need for such information is important because the presentence investigator is also
obligated to make a "recommendation regarding a psychological examination and a
plan of rehabilitation." I.C.R. 32(b)(10) (emphasis added). 5 Just as the district court in
this case was unable to fulfill its obligation to ensure a satisfactory and complete record
without the requested psychiatric evaluation, so too was the presentence investigator
unable to fulfill her obligation under the Idaho Criminal Rules without that evaluation.
Without information regarding a potentially-critical part of Mr. Childers' prognosis,
the presentence investigator could not provide an adequate plan of rehabilitation, or
consequently, an adequate recommendation for sentencing.
Furthermore, the request was made as soon as possible, given when the
psychosexual evaluation was provided to the district court and counsel. According to
defense counsel, he had no opportunity to discuss the recommendation for a psychiatric
evaluation with his client before the sentencing hearing. (Tr., p.26, L.16 - p.27, L.4.)
As such, the motion was made as timely as possible, and the State's contention that it
was not timely is meritless, particularly since the State's representative below did
not object to the reservation by either defense counsel or the district court of their
decisions in regard to a potential psychiatric evaluation until after receiving and
reviewing the psychosexual evaluation. (See Resp. Br., p.12.) Regardless, "defense

This is particularly true since Mr. Childers actually requested the preparation of this
necessary evaluation, pointing out the insufficiency in the record to the district court.
Compare Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 823; State v. Hanson, 150 Idaho 729, 731 (Ct. App.
2011).
5 The district court's discretion regarding psychiatric evaluations is guided by both
I.C. § 19-2522 and I.C.R. 32. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822.
4
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counsel's lack of diligence do not, however, excuse the trial court from compliance with

§ 19-2522." Coonts, 127 Idaho at 153 (Ct. App. 2002). And, as in Coonts, the district
court's failure to comply with its statutory obligation demands action by this Court.

Compare id.; Banbury, 145 Idaho at 269-270.
Additionally, since the obligation imposed on the district court is mandated by
I.C. § 19-2522, the district court's discretion to regulate its calendar is irrelevant.

(See Resp. Br., p.15 (citing Dep't of Labor and Indus. Serv. v. East Idaho Mills, Inc., 111
Idaho 137, 138-39 (Ct. App. 1986).) This is because the statute uses the mandatory (as
opposed to the permissive) instruction of "shall." 6 For example, "If there is reason to
believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing
and for good cause shown, the court shall appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist
or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of the
defendant. ... The report of the examination shall include the following: .... " I.C. § 192522(1) and (3) (emphasis added). As such, whatever discretion the district court may
have with regard to the control of its calendar,7 that discretion is limited by the statutory
mandate with regard to the necessary psychiatric evaluation. See I.C. § 19-2522. The

6

"[The Idaho Supreme Court] has interpreted the meaning of the word 'may' appearing
in legislation, as having the meaning or expressing the right to exercise discretion.
When used in a statute, the word 'may' is permissive rather than the imperative
or mandatory meaning of 'must' or 'shall."'
Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848
(1995) (citations omitted); see also Twin Falls County v. Idaho Comm'n on Redistricting,
152 Idaho 346, 350 (2012).
7 The authority to which the State cites for this assertion arose under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 16 governing pre-trial activities. East Idaho Mills, 111 Idaho at 136-37. Even
if a parallel could be drawn between the district court's discretion regarding its calendar
in criminal, as opposed to civil, matters (for example, the defendant's constitutional right
to a speedy trial could impact the district court's unfettered ability to control its calendar
or do substantial justice in the case), the critical fact in Mr. Childers' case is that it deals
with a post-conviction issue, not a pre-trial issue.
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district court was required to order a psychiatric evaluation before it imposed
Mr. Childers' sentence. Banbury, 145 Idaho at 269-70. And in regard to the presence
of the victim and her family, while their presence is noteworthy, their presence does not
create an exception to the district court's statutory obligation. 8 See generally I.C. § 192522.
Therefore, since the record does not address the treatment alternative, in
particular, the potential for a psychotropic medication regimen (which could help resolve
the major issue underlying Mr. Childers' actions), nor does it provide information on the
risks and benefits of treatment as opposed to continued nontreatment, the record does
not satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3).

By not ensuring that those

requirements are addressed in the record by ordering a psychiatric evaluation, the
district court has failed to meet its statutory obligation in that regard. Compare Coonts,
127 Idaho at 153; Banbury, 145 Idaho at 269-270.

There is no valid reason for the

district court to forgo that evaluation since Mr. Childers' mental condition was put
squarely at issue in sentencing by his attorney before the sentencing hearing and it did
play a role in the actions underlying the charges in this case.

As such, the district

court's denial of Mr. Childers' request for a psychiatric evaluation constituted an
abuse of its discretion and a failure to meet its statutory obligation in this regard.

8

Mr. Childers recognizes that victims are afforded certain rights in criminal proceedings.
See, e.g., I.C. § 19-5306. As such, it may have been appropriate for the district court to
hear the victims' statements at that time, but Mr. Childers contends that in order for the
district court to still satisfy its statutory obligation under I.C. §19-2522, it would have
then had to continue the hearing until that report could be prepared and submitted. He
also asserts that none of the victim's rights should be allowed to trump or otherwise
retard his constitutional or statutory rights or circumvent statutory obligations imposed
on the district court, particularly if the only justification for doing so is convenience.
11

See Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822; McFarland, 125 Idaho at 879. This Court should

remedy that error.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Childers respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and
remand his case for resentencing after the necessary evaluation has been performed.
DATED this 19th day of July, 2012.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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